Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Scot Roberts, Brenda Roberts v. Milton Muir
Construction Company, Inc., A.J. Dean Cement
Company, Milton Muir, Gale Muir, John R. Moyle,
Moyle Landscaping Company : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Scott Berry; Green & Berry; Attorney for Appellant.
Reid W. Lambert; Michelle A. Ontiveros; Woodbury & Kesler; Attorney for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Scot Roberts, Brenda Roberts v. Milton Muir Construction Company, Inc., A.J. Dean Cement Company, Milton Muir, Gale Muir,
John R. Moyle, Moyle Landscaping Company, No. 970146 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/719

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

GREEN & BERRY
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY (0311)
Attorneys for Appellant A.J. Dean and Sons
Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc.
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

"•""Cow,
HAY

-

UTAH A

WHEALS
EMRttSF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE#JE£H

SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,

DQCUMFNT
KFU
50
A10
DOCKET NO.

qnDMte-Cfr

vs.
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; A. J. DEAN
CEMENT COMPANY; MILTON MUIR;
GALE MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE,
a/k/a MOYLE LANDSCAPING
COMPANY,

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF ON
APPEAL

Court of Appeals No. 970146-CA
(District Court No. 930901740)

Defendants.
Argument Priority No. 15

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Presiding

REID W. LAMBERT (A5744)
WOODBURY & KESLER
Attorneys for Appellees Scot
and Brenda Roberts
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 364-1100

RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY (A0311)
GREEN & BERRY
Attorneys for Appellant A.J.
Dean Ready Mix Concrete
Company, Inc.
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 841112714
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

GREEN & BERRY
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY (0311)
Attorneys for Appellant A.J. Dean and Sons
Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc.
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; A. J. DEAN
CEMENT COMPANY; MILTON MUIR;
GALE MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE,
a/k/a MOYLE LANDSCAPING
COMPANY,

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF ON
APPEAL

Court of Appeals No. 970146-CA
(District Court No. 930901740)

Defendants.
Argument Priority No. 15

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Presiding

REID W. LAMBERT (A5744)
WOODBURY & KESLER
Attorneys for Appellees Scot
and Brenda Roberts
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 364-1100

RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY (A0311)
GREEN & BERRY
Attorneys for Appellant A.J.
Dean Ready Mix Concrete
Company, Inc.
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 841112714
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ARGUMENT

1

I.
A.J. DEAN'S INADVERTENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE
ORDER OF APRIL 5, 1994 COMPELLING DISCOVERY CANNOT
REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS WILLFUL, IN BAD FAITH, OR
FAULT
A.

B.
II.

1

The sequence of errors began with the Roberts'
service of form medical malpractice discovery
which had nothing to do with the issues in
this case

2

Mondayr March 21r 1993; the hearing on
Roberts' Motion to Compel

4

IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ENTER A SANCTION
BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW. THE TRIAL
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT GREEN AND BERRY WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO RULE 5 SERVICE OF THE PROPOSED FORM OF
ORDER WAS AN ERROR OF LAW

8

III. THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON A.J. DEAN'S PARTICIPATION
AT THE HEARING ON DAMAGES WERE IMPROPER

11

The Roberts' presentation of proof Of prima
facie claims through proffer of counsel rather
than direct testimony was improper

12

A.J. Dean's cross-examination of witnesses on
the issue of unliquidated damages was
improperly constrained

14

A.

B.

C.

The clear and convincing standard which

applies to punitive damage claims cannot be
satisfied by a one-sided presentation of
evidence where the alleged wrongdoer has been

silenced by the
court
IV.

15

THE VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
COMMITTED BY THE LAW FIRM REPRESENTING THE ROBERTS
REQUIRES THAT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE SET ASIDE . . 17

CONCLUSION

21

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Pages
Cases
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961
(Utah App. 1989)
2, 4, 8
Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1204
(Utah 1985)

18, 19, 20

Morton v. Continental Baking Co.r 938 P.2d 271, 274,
(Utah 1997)

1,2,4,8

Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Servicesf 663 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1983)
Wright v. Wrightr 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 1997)

11
1

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 et. seq

15

Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-4

11
Other

Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Rule 4-506

9, 10, 11

Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Rule 4-507

9

Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, Cannon 4 (1977)
Utah Code of Professional Responsibility,
Cannon 5 (1977)

. 20
19, 20

Utah Code of Professional Responsibility,
Cannon 9 (1977)

18, 20

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5

9

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37

7

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(a)

7

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)

11

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

7, 17

iii

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602

13

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 703

13

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7

. .

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(c)

17, 18, 20, 21
. . . . . .

18

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9

18

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10

18

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.2

18

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; A. J. DEAN
CEMENT COMPANY; MILTON MUIR;
GALE MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE,
a/k/a MOYLE LANDSCAPING
COMPANY,

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF ON
APPEAL

Court Of Appeals No. 970146-CA
(District Court No. 930901740)

Defendants.
Argument Priority No. 15

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ARGUMENT
I.

A.J. DEAN'S INADVERTENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
THE ORDER OF APRIL 5, 1994 COMPELLING
DISCOVERY CANNOT REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED
AS WILLFUL, IN BAD FAITH, OR FAULT.

A.J. Dean and the Roberts agree that the standard of review
for the imposition of discovery sanctions is set forth in

Morton v. Continental Baking cp,, 938 p.2d 27i, 274, (Utah 1997)
and Wright v. Wrightf 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 1997). (A.J. Dean's
Brief on Appeal, p. 2; Roberts' Brief, p. 8, 9.)
"We have never expressed any rule which
delineates a specific level of behavior which
must be met before rule 37 sanctions are
warranted. As stated previously, a party's
conduct merits sanctions under rule 37 if any
of the following circumstances are found: (1)
the party's behavior was willful; (2) the
party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court

can attribute some fault to the party; or (4)
the party has engaged in persistent dilatory
tactics tending to frustrate the judicial
process.(emphasis added).
938 P.2d at 276.
A.J. Dean accepts Roberts1 definition of willful conduct in
this context (Roberts' Brief, p. 10); to find that a party's
behavior has been willful, there need only be "any intentional
failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance." Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettlerr 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App. 1989).
In this appeal A.J. Dean challenges the conclusion of the
trial court that its noncompliance satisfies the standard
described in Morton.

A.J. Dean's failure to meet the April 5,

1994 deadline was merely the last domino to fall in a sequence of
inadvertent errors by both parties, beginning with Roberts'
mistaken service of form medical malpractice interrogatories.
A.

The sequence of errors began with the
Roberts' service of form medical malpractice
discovery which had nothing to do with the
issues in this pase^

The interrogatories served by the Roberts on A.J. Dean,
which eventually gave rise to the default sanction, are included
in Addendum A to A.J. Dean's Brief on Appeal.
malpractice interrogatories.

They are medical

The Roberts characterize these

interrogatories as flawed by a clerical or typographical error.
More accurately, a cursory review reveals that the questions
posed have absolutely nothing to do with the substantive issues
of this case.

In the context of this lawsuit they are nonsense.

The logical response of any attorney confronted with such

2

questions is properly puzzlement and confusion.
A.J. Dean communicated its confusion to Jaryl L. Rencher,
Roberts1 counsel, as shown by Rencher's letters to A.J. Dean's
counsel, Randall Marshall.1

Rencher's letter of November 11,

1993 states:
"There was typographical error in them and I
have corrected that in the correspondence to
this individual named "Robert" which I
informed you I prepared immediately after my
conversation with him. Please excuse the
references to medical malpractice and instead
insert "information relative to this case and
the property in question." (R. 405.)
Rencher's letter of December 9, 1993, reiterates the
request:
"Robert indicated to me that he acknowledges
there had been some typographical mistakes in
my clients interrogatories and requests for
production of documents and I suggested that
he consider any references to medical
malpractice or hospitalization as instead
involving allegations in this suit. If you
will substitute "any allegations or claims in
this suit or the property in question" for
those typographical errors I would appreciate
it." (R. 406.)
In these two letters, Rencher shifted the responsibility
for his initial clerical mistake to

Marshall.

It was left up to

Marshall to determine how to make sense of the non sequitur
interrogatories, and to decide which should disregarded and which
should be answered.

1

Both letters were included as exhibits to Roberts'
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Compel. (R. 384.)
Roberts' Brief on Appeal, p. 4, confirms that Marshall was
instructed to "disregard inapplicable interrogatories."
Marshall was to decide which interrogatories to disregard.

3

Marshall tried to comply.

On January 24, 1994, Marshall

filed A.J. Dean's responses to the flawed discovery.
444.)

(R. 433-

In the response Marshall included a general objection

referencing the irrelevancy of the questions posed.

(R. 434.)

Rencherfs dissatisfaction with Marshall's effort to correctly
guess how to respond to the botched interrogatories was the basis
for the Motion to Compel that gave rise to the entry of the
default sanction.2

Not until March 21, 1994, at the hearing on

the Motion to Compel did Rencher specify which interrogatories
would have to be answered.
While the developing confusion originated in the bungled
discovery served by Rencher, it does not seem fair or accurate to
characterize the actions of the Roberts, by inadvertently serving
the defective interrogatories, or of A.J. Dean, for not
understanding how to respond, as "willful" in the language of
Morton and Arnicat
B.

Monday.

Roberts

1

March 21r 1993; the hearing on

Motion to Compelt

The transcript of the March 21, 1993 hearing on Roberts'
Motion to Compel is included in its entirety as Addendum "B" to
A.J. Dean's Brief on Appeal.

The communication that occurred

during that hearing is important to the proper characterization
of A.J. Dean's non-compliance. Because Green & Berry did not

2

At the hearing on the motion to compel, March 21, 1994,
Marshall argued the irrelevancy to the questions posed to the
court (R. 2379 at p. 13), and Rencher agreed to waive answers to
all the interrogatories, with the exception of Nos. 23 and 26.
(R. 2379 at 16-17.

4

subsequently receive timely notice of the bench ruling issued
during hearing, the assertion that A.J. Dean's non-compliance was
intentional is grounded in the fact that Marshall, A.J. Dean's
counsel at the time of the hearing, and Robert Bagley, an
employee of the firm, were present when the Court issued the
bench ruling.

The trial court concluded that A.J. Dean's failure

to comply with the Order to Compel was intentional because these
two individuals were in the courtroom when the bench ruling was
made, regardless of Green & Berry's subsequent ignorance of the
ruling.
The discussion that took place during the hearing between
Court and counsel was conducted in the esoteric vocabulary of
civil procedure.

Bagley, as an untrained layman, could not be

expected to fully understand or comprehend much of what was said.
Because he was present with attorney Randall Marshall, who
represented A.J. Dean, Bagley was entitled to rely on the
experience and training of Marshall for an accurate
interpretation and explanation of the legal discussion.

Bagley's

failure to understand the ruling, and the consequences that
attached to the ruling, was the result of ignorance, not
intention.
Marshall no doubt understood the bench ruling issued during
the hearing.

However, three days after the hearing, on Thursday,

March 24, 1994 Marshall's authority to represent A.J. Dean was
withdrawn, terminating any responsibility he had to ensure
compliance with the bench ruling.
5

That same day, Julie V. Lund

of Green & Berry picked up from Marshall's office the litigation
file.

She did not speak with

Marshall personally.

When she

reviewed the file, she found nothing in it describing the bench
ruling.

(Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R. 1795 Para. 2.)

At this critical juncture, the attorney who knew about the
obligation arising from the bench ruling believed his
responsibility for the case had been terminated; and the
attorneys who had responsibility for the case had no knowledge of
the bench ruling.

One could argue that Marshall should have done

more to make sure that the critical information was communicated
to new counsel, in the same way that one could argue that Rencher
should have taken more care in proofreading the interrogatories
that he sent out.

It would not be accurate or fair to

characterize either oversight

as intentional.

The events that subsequently took place between March 24,
1994 and April 29, 1994, as evidenced in the Affidavits of
Raymond Scott Berry, Julie V. Lund and Randall Marshall, are set
forth in detail in paragraphs 14-39 of Appellants Statement of
Facts, Brief on Appeal, pages 12-20.

The factual "bottom line"

is that Green & Berry did not learn of the critical ruling until
April 12, 1994.

(Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R. 1795, para. 28,

Brief on Appeal, p.16.)

The immediate cause of Green & Berry

continuing ignorance of the discovery deadline was Rencherfs
decision on March 31, 1994 to serve the proposed form of the
Order to Compel on Marshall, who believed he was out of the case,
rather than on Green & Berry, which had been communicating with
6

Rencher verbally, in letters, and in pleadings as counsel for
A.J. Dean.
Rencher filed the Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike the Answer of
A.J. Dean and enter its default on April 14, 1994. (R. 688.)

The

record shows that beginning on April 14, 1994 A.J. Dean, through
its counsel Green & Berry, took every possible action permitted
by the Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain minimal relief from the
order setting the April 5, 1994 deadline, filing a motion for a
short extension of time and a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
the order.

The Roberts received full and complete responses to

the two unanswered interrogatories on April 18, 1994.
(Certificate of Service R. 706; copies of complete response at R.
1756-1784.3)
The question raised by this appeal is whether A.J. Dean's
failure to meet the April 5, 1994 deadline in the context
described above was intentional or inadvertent.

The facts

establish that A.J. Dean and its counsel intended at all times to
comply with its discovery obligations, and endeavored to the best
of their ability to do so, despite the confusion created by the
botched interrogatories served by the Roberts.

3

The completeness of these responses were never challenged
by a Rule 37 motion. However, the Findings of Fact drafted by
Rencher in support of the Order entering the default of A.J.
Dean, and adopted by the trial court, include a finding that the
response was incomplete. (R. 1567, para. 23.) A.J. Dean
contends that the response was complete, and to the extent the
finding is taken a face value, objects to being denied an
opportunity to defend the responses according to the procedure
set forth in Rule 37(a)(2).

7

The inadvertence which caused A.J. Dean to miss the April 5
deadline was the product of a sequence of "clerical" errors
committed by both parties, to use the word chosen by Rencher to
describe his own mistake in sending out the wrong set of form
interrogatories.

There is no evidence which will support the

conclusion that these errors were intentional, within the rule
described in Morton and Arnica.

Imposing the sanction of default

for inadvertent errors is an abuse of discretion.
II.

IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ENTER A
SANCTION BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF
LAW. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT GREEN
& BERRY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RULE 5 SERVICE OF
THE PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER WAS AN ERROR OF
LAW.

Morton also stands for the proposition that it is an abuse
of discretion to enter a discovery sanction based on an erroneous
conclusion of law.
"We will find that a trial court has abused
its discretion in choosing which sanction to
impose only if there is either "an erroneous
conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiary
basis for the trial court's ruling."
271 P.2d at 274.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the
Roberts were not required to serve pleadings, including the
proposed form of order containing the April 5 deadline (served
March 31, 1994 on Marshall only), on Green & Berry after the firm
entered its appearance in this action by a pleading entitled
Substitution of Counsel on March 29, 1994. (Substitution at R.
575. Conclusions of Law in Support of Order Striking Answer and

8

Entering Default, R. 1561, Para, 4 0

The court also concluded

that Rencher's service of pleadings on Marshall was sufficient to
satisfy Rule 5 obligations, although Randall and A.J. Dean
believed that Randall's representation of the company had
terminated on March 29, 1994.

(Conclusions of Law in Support of

Order Striking Answering and Entering Default, R. 1560-63, para.
4-14.)
The trial court erred in reasoning that because Marshall had
not moved for and received leave of court to withdraw under the
provisions of Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration,
he remained counsel of record for A.J. Dean, despite the
substitution of counsel.
The reasoning employed by the trial court is in direct
contravention of Rule 4-507, which currently allows substitution
of counsel without leave of court.
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Statement of the Rule. . .
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may
replace the current counsel of record by
filing and serving a notice of substitution
of counsel. Filing a substitution of counsel
enters the appearance of new counsel of
record and effectuates the withdrawal of the
attorney being replaced. Where a request for
a delay of proceedings is not made,
substitution of counsel does not require the
approval of the court. Where new counsel
requests a delay of proceedings, substitution
of counsel requires the approval of the court
as provided in this rule. (Emphasis added)
History: Amended effective January 15, 1990;
April 15, 1991; May 15, 1994; November 1,
1997.
9

Although Subsection (5) was formally added to the language
of the Rule 4-506 effective November 1, 1997, the method
described therein for replacing one counsel with another has long
been standard practice, as the obvious way to synchronize the
change of counsel without leaving any gap in representation.
The legal conclusion of the trial court in regard to the
substitution of counsel and Green & Berry's right to have been
served with all pleadings after March 29, 1994 is plainly
contrary to the current language of the rule.

The only genuine

question is whether a sanction of default premised on the error
should be allowed to stand because the amendment occurred during
the course of this appeal.
The Roberts agree that Utah cases hold that changes in
rules of civil and court administration apply retroactively where
the change affects procedure and does not destroy vested or
contract rights.

(Roberts1 Brief on Appeal, p. 16.) Rule 4-506

concerns court procedures only and does not, by its own terms,
directly impact any vested right.
In common parlance, the term "vested" implies rights awarded
on the merits after full due process. A.J. Dean was denied the
opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in support of
its valid defenses.

A default judgment granted in violation of

current law does not qualify as a "vested" right. 4

4

The holding in Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services,
663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983), cited in Roberts1 Brief on Appeal,
p. 16, is that §78-45b-4, Utah Code Ann.f facilitating the
10

The Roberts seem to agree that procedural statutes which do
not impact vested rights apply to pending actions.

The Roberts1

claim that this action is not a pending action is impossible to
accept in light of the fact half the claims in this case are
still pending in the trial court.

The claims of the Roberts'

against the defendants Milton Muir Construction, Milton Muir and
Gale Muir are still before the trial court, and involve the same
factual circumstances relating to the construction of the
Roberts' driveway that gave rise to the claims against A.J.
Dean.5
The lower court's mistaken interpretation of Rule 4-506
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

When a discovery sanction of

default is premised on an abuse of discretion, the sanction
should be set aside.
III. THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON A.J. DEAN'S
PARTICIPATION AT THE HEARING ON DAMAGES WERE
IMPROPER.
The hearing on damages had two main purposes. First, the
Roberts were required to make a prima
of their causes of actions.

facie

showing of the proof

Second, the Roberts were required to

prove their unliquidated damages by competent evidence.
(Conclusions of Law in support of Order denying A.J. Dean's

recovery of child support obligations, enacted in 1975, will be
interpreted to apply retroactively to the child support payments
owed by Pilcher under a 1965 Utah divorce decree.
5

This is an interlocutory appeal. The default judgment
rendered against A.J. Dean contained a Rule 54(b) certification.
(R. 2351 para. 4.)
11

Motion for Full Participation in Further Proceedings (R. 16781682, para. 1-22, describing limitations to be placed on A.J.
Dean's participation in the damages hearing.)

A.J. Dean

generally challenges the constraints on its participation in the
damages hearing imposed by the trial court.

A.

The Roberts1 presentation Qf prppf Qf prima
facie
claims through proffer of counsel
rather than direct testimony was improper.

The Roberts presented the evidence of the prima

facie

proof

of their claims by direct narrative proffer of their counsel
rather than by direct testimony.6 (R. 2386 at p. 43-90.)

Counsel

for A.J. Dean was not permitted to cross-examine counsel for the
Roberts, Lambert, or the Roberts themselves; present direct
evidence; make legal argument; or participate in any fashion in
regard to the presentation of prima

facie

proof.

The narrative

as actually delivered by Lambert came out as a melange of legal
exposition and argument, sprinkled here and there with reference
to "facts" that the Roberts would testify to if called.

Lambert

made no effort to limit his proffer to facts that could

6

Lambert, the Roberts1 counsel, described the manner in
which he would proceed as follows; "So , all I'm prepared to do
as far as that is concerned is to, for instance, go to the
applicable claim,
cite to the Court the appropriate
authority to state what the elements are, explain to the court
why the complaint is sufficient to state a claim..., let the
court rule on whether it does or does not, and proceed to the
next claim." (R. 2386 at p. 36.) Berry objected to proceeding in
this manner, and his objection was overruled. (Id. at 37-38.)
Lambert proceeded as described, with the Roberts being sworn and
adopting as their testimony the narrative presented by Lambert
at its conclusion.
Berry continued to make objections during
the course of the narrative which were overruled.

12

conceivably be known by the Roberts.
For example, addressing the claim of trespass, Lambert
proffered that his clients would testify that A.J. Dean did not
receive permission to enter their property from Milton Muir, the
general contractor.

(R. 2386 at p. 45.)

The Roberts obviously

could not have personal knowledge concerning Muir's statements to
A.J. Dean.

In the same fashion, Lambert proffered that Mrs.

Roberts, a housewife, would testify that A.J. Dean breached the
standard of care owed by ready mix concrete companies. (R. 2386
at p. 49.)

The narrative proffer is replete with similar

examples of Lambert proffering as testimony "facts" which were
completely beyond even the theoretical personal knowledge of his
clients.
What constitutes "competent evidence" is defined by Rule 602
of the Utah Rules <?f Evidence.
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge.
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist
of the witness1 own testimony. This rule is
subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses."
Lambert's narrative proffer failed to include information
that would show that his clients had the personal knowledge that
would make them competent or qualified to testify concerning many
of the "facts" he put in their mouths.

Confident that the court

would overrule all objections made by Berry, and aware that

13

neither he nor his clients would be subject to any crossexamination, Lambert's presentation of prima

facie

proof by

narrative proffer was nothing more than a charade, completely
disconnected from any real effort to find the true facts.
This manner of proceeding aptly demonstrates why the right
to cross-examination is a bedrock element in the system of
justice.

Regardless of any particular burden of proof to be met,

cross-examination provides the means for separating flights of
fancy from actual fact.

Without cross-examination, a statement

that "the moon is made of green cheese" has the same evidentiary
weight as "the light turned green."
By choosing to eliminate all concern for the competency of
the proffered evidence, the lower court violated its independent
obligation try to determine the real facts as the necessary
precursor to doing justice.
B.

A-J- Peep's gross-exfrminatjcpn of witnesses on
the issue of unliquidated damages was
improperly constrained.

A.J. Dean was permitted to conduct a limited form of crossexamination of the witnesses providing testimony of unliquidated
damages.

A. J. Dean was not allowed to introduce evidence on

cross-examination; was not allowed to ask questions impeaching
the Roberts based on their adoption of the "facts" presented in
the narrative of Lambert which they adopted (R. 2386 at p. 109) ;
was not allowed to ask questions focusing on whether the damages
claimed were caused by A.J. Dean (R. 2386 at p. 126-127); was not
allowed to ask Mr. Thomas, who testified about the cost to
14

replace the Roberts1 driveway, whether the driveway as installed
functioned adequately (R. 2386 at p. 28).
As a result of these constraints, the unliquidated damage
testimony presents a seriously incomplete and warped version of
facts relevant to unliquidated damages.

As applied, those

constraints had the effect of eliminating the basic requirement
that as part of their damage case the Roberts present some
competent evidence that the damages complained of were
proximately caused by A.J. Dean.

c.

The clear and convincing standard which
applies tc punitive damage claims cannot be
satisfied by a one-sided presentation of

evidence where the alleged wrongdoer has been
silenced by the courtt
At the conclusion of the hearing on damages A.J. Dean argued
that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for
the award of punitive damages under §78-18-1 et. seq. Utah Code
Ann, could not be satisfied in a one sided evidentiary
proceeding. (R. 2386 at p. 214-225.)

The lower court disagreed,

taking the position that just as the court could award punitive
damages in a default matter where the defendant failed to appear
at all, it could award punitive damages in this case despite the
fact that A.J. Dean had appeared, and had been denied an
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way at the damages
hearing.

(R. 2386 at p. 215-220.)

The trial court failed to appreciate the critical difference
between the two situations.

Where a defendant is defaulted for

making no appearance whatsoever, the defendant has consciously
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chosen not to appear.

In such situations trial courts as a rule

try to make sure that the defendant has received personal notice
of the proceeding, and has elected not to appear.
In this case, A.J. Dean actively appeared, and attempted to
participate as fully and completely in every proceeding as the
court would allow.

A.J. Dean was ready, willing and able to

present evidence in support of its position and opposing any
award of punitive damages, as demonstrated by the lengthy written
proffer of evidence which it filed prior to the damages hearing.
(R. 1976; proffer stricken, R. 2384 at p. 3.)
Despite those efforts, the lower court chose to treat A.J.
Dean as a ghost in the courtroom.

A.J. Dean had ceased to have

any legal substance when the default sanction was entered.

This

was not the standard "default" situation, where the defendant has
chosen not participate.
The issue raised in this appeal is one of first impression.
What right does a defendant, whose answer has been stricken as
discovery sanction, have to challenge evidence supporting an
award of punitive damages?

Can the clear and convincing

statutory standard be met based on a totally one sided
presentation of evidence, when the alleged wrongdoer is present
in the courtroom actively seeking an opportunity to present
opposing evidence?
A.J. Dean believes that given the special place that
punitive damage claims hold in the civil justice system, the
court has an independent duty to determine if the statutory
16

standard has been satisfied,

when a defendant is absent by

choice, the only option available to the court may be

oase its

decision solely on the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
However, when the defendant is present, requesting an opportunity
to present contrary evidence, the court is duty bound to hear and
consider that evidence.

A one sided presentation of evidence in

a proceeding in which the alleged wrongdoer has been silenced by
the court cannot, by definition, be clear and convincing to an
objective reviewer.
IV.

THE VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS COMMITTED BY THE LAW FIRM REPRESENTING
THE ROBERTS REQUIRES THAT THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BE SET ASIDE.

The Roberts admit that the law firm representing the Roberts
(Hanson, Epperson and Smith, P.C., hereafter "law firm") acted in
violation of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in
representing both the Roberts and A.J. Dean at the same time.
(Roberts1 Brief on Appeal, p. 24.)

The issue on appeal is

whether the entry of default obtained by the firm against one of
its current clients while the conflict was present should stand.7
The Roberts1 only argument for allowing the default to stand
is that A.J. Dean was not prejudiced by their firm's concurrent
represents,

>f adverse parties.

7

They contend that the law

The violation of Rule 1.7 was not discovered by A.J. Dean
until after its default had been entered, and its Rule 60(b)
motion to set aside the default filed. The lower court was made
aware of the violation at oral argument on the Rule 60(b) motion.
(R. 2383 at p. 4.) Rencher testified as to the facts of the
conflict at the hearing on damages. (R. 2386 at p. 139-140, 165167.)
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firm's withdrawal from the case when the conflict was discovered
cured the violation, and vindicated the policy that gives force
to Rule 1.7.8

The policy that gives rise to Rule 1.7 was

succinctly described in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1204 (Utah 1985), applying the former rule, Cannon 9, Utah Code
Qf Professional Responsibility/ 1977.
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety." The basis of this tenet is
that society's perception of the integrity of our legal
system may be as important as the reality, since it is
the perception that engenders public confidence that
justice will be dispensed. Litigants are highly
unlikely to be able to maintain this confidence if
their attorney in one matter is allowed simultaneously
to sue them in another, (emphasis added)
In Margulies, the law firm represented the plaintiffs in a
medical malpractice action where the defendants included several
individual physicians.

Subsequent to the filing of the medical

malpractice action, the firm agreed to represent a limited
partnership in other litigation.

Three of the limited partners

were physician defendants in the malpractice action.

The firm

failed to consult with the doctors about the conflict, or obtain
the permission of the doctors to represent adverse parties
concurrently.

When the physicians learned of the conflict, they

filed a motion in the malpractice action asking that the firm be

For the purpose of analyzing conflicts of interest, law
firms are treated as a single entity, subject to the same rules
that would control the actions of any single member of the firm,
if practicing alone. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10(a)
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9
or 2.2.
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directed to withdraw i t oi» tut- representation of the medical
malpractice plaintiffs.
The trial court gave the firm the option of withdrawing from
the limited partnership litigation, as opposed to being required
to withdraw from the malpractice case.
the partneishif

lituiation.

The firm withdrew from

The physicians took the position

that withdrawal from that case did n

remedy the ethical

violation, and an interlocutory appeal was taken.
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court determined that
the standard of review that applied was abuse of discretion, and
hel

l t w a s a n a j D U s e 0f

allow the firm to continue

discretion for the trial court to
f|

j represent the malpractice

plaintiffs, despite the harm that withdrawal would cause the
plaintiffs

The Supreme Court specifically rejected the

contention that the withdrawal of the firm from the partnership
litigation after the conflict was discovered cured the violation;
"It is our strong view that an attorney
who is simultaneously representing two
clients with differing interests should not
be able to avoid conforming to Cannon 5 by
simply dropping one of the clients at his
option when a disqualification motion is
filed.(citations omitted). Otherwise, little
incentive would exist for attorneys to avoid
dual employment by adverse parties in the
first place."
696 P.2d at 1202.
Here the Roberts argue that because they were successful in
having the default of A.J. Dean entered before the ethical
violation was discovered, A.J. Dean should be satisfied v
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fact that the Roberts found new counsel to complete the default
proceedings.

In layman's terms,

if the critical aspects of

litigation can be finished before the unwitting client discovers
the conflict, he is stuck with the results that his ethically
challenged attorney achieved for the favored client.
This cynical interpretation of Rule 1.7 is completely
inconsistent with the fundamental principles which characterize
the relationship between lawyers and clients.
"In finding that conflict of interest
existed by reason of Jones, Waldo's
concurrent representation of the appellants
and the Margulies family, the trial court
noted: "The law has long recognized that an
attorney is held to the highest duty of
fidelity, honor, fair dealing and full
disclosure to a client.• We believe that the
trial court's language is an excellent
summary of the obligations imposed on counsel
by the Utah Code of Professional
Responsibility Cannons 4, 5, 9 (1977): the
duty to preserve the confidences and secrets
of the client, Cannon 4; the duty to exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf
of the client, Cannon 5; and the duty to
avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety, Cannon 9." (emphasis added)
696 P.2d at 1201.
The law imposes a fiduciary duty upon lawyers forbidding
concurrent representation of adverse parties to ensure that
clients will not have to wonder if their attorneys are in fact
loyal to them.

The Roberts' argument that there was in fact no

sharing of confidences within the firm misses the point.
There is no Utah case describing the general course of
action to be followed when a law firm, while acting in breach of
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Rule 1.7, obtains a lesull Im
prejudices a current client.

cine client which severely
However, in this case, in keeping

with the commitment of the legal profession to self government,
the course of action most supportive of the policies that forbid
conflicts of interest is to set aside the default judgment, and
a 11 ov i me ,M«.f" in proceed to trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts 1 effort to preserve a default judgment does not
raise the same concerns that would be present if a judgment had
been rendered on the merits.

Because the Roberts1 claims against

the Muir defendants are pending below, returning their claims
against A ". Dean to the trial court for full adjudication on the
merits does not place an extraordinary burden on the Roberts or
the trial court.

Finally, the unique events that gave rise to

the default judgment in the first place

(the service of the

wrong interrogatories, the failure to serve critical pleadings on
the counsel of record, thp refusal of the trial court to
recognize responsible counsel as chosen by A.J. Dean) provide
independent justification for sending the case back for trial on
the merits.
DATED this

Q?

day of May, 1998.
GREEN AND BERRY

BY.

Ra^TRond S c o t t B e r r y "
A t t o r n e y f o r A . J . Wepri Ready Mix
Cement Company, I n c . , A p p e l l a n t
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